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8.1 Introduction
Blown in by a windstorm from the East, Mary Poppins came to the 
Banks’ home at Number 17 Cherry Tree Lane, London. The main char-
acter of P. L. Travers’ children’s novel, published in 1934, is allegedly 
the world’s best-known “nanny.”1 The Banks’ household is a traditional 
one. Mr Banks works in a bank in the City of London, leaving the 
task of hiring a suitable nanny for their children to Mrs Banks alone. 
Mrs Banks places a job advertisement in the newspaper, specifying 
a strong letter of recommendation as a requirement. Thus, a female 
employer decides the employment conditions of and negotiates with 
the female employee—a woman directing another woman.2 In the 
Banks’ home, the nanny is to work in a live-in environment, sleep 
in a nursery room, and have one day off every other Thursday. Even 
then, of course, it is not a full day, but only the afternoon between 
1:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. In the eyes of the nanny’s employer, there exists 
neither labor standard legislation nor any basic rights for laborers or 
employees.
The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that today 
there are up to 100 million Mary Poppinses around the world. It claims 
that these women are forced to bear even tougher conditions than the 
main character of Travers’ children’s novel.3 It is an airplane, not an 
east wind, that brings them to developed countries, such as Britain, 
from developing countries such as the Philippines. They arrive in high 
numbers to look after families in host countries, leaving their own fami-
lies behind. Female overseas workers are also increasingly participating 
in other sectors traditionally considered to be “women’s work,” such 
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as health care and nursing for the sick and elderly (Ehrenreich & 
Hochschild, 2002; Kingma, 2006). Their basic rights, including days off 
each week, set hours, and minimum wage, have often been ignored, as 
if they have been forced into modern-day slavery.
This chapter analyzes the situation of today’s Mary Poppinses in 
developed countries and beyond from an international relations 
scholar ship perspective. In doing so, it focuses on the household as 
the basic unit of social reproduction, and aims to reveal the causes and 
effects of its reconfiguration beyond national borders. The conditions 
of female migrant workers are by no means simply a deal between a 
powerful and a not-so powerful woman. Rather, both women form part 
of a rapidly growing phenomenon described as “global householding.”4 
Such a phenomenon is not confined to one region, but is prevalent all 
over the world. Asia is certainly not immune from it.
This chapter concentrates on three tasks. First, by examining the 
“security”5 and “insecurity” of female overseas domestic workers 
(FODWs), it aims to incorporate the perspectives of both “gender”6 and 
migration studies into the discipline of security studies. Within the study 
of International Relations (IR), security studies have traditionally focused 
on the military concerns of states. Recently, towards and since the end of 
the Cold War, security studies has undergone enormous changes, its 
scope of study being greatly expanded to cover non-military dimensions 
of security (Buzan, 1991). The field may nonetheless still lack analytical 
frameworks that integrate these wider issues into a holistic notion of 
security. “Global householding” is a vastly understudied, if not com-
pletely ignored, subject within security studies, despite involving an 
increasing number of countries and affecting so many people’s lives both 
in positive and negative ways.
Second, this chapter attempts to explain how constraining regimes 
are in fact currently constructed in a multi-layered form, subsequently 
strengthening the “insecurity” of FODWs. It then demonstrates that 
these multi-layered regimes at national, regional, and global levels, 
whether upheld in practice or circumvented, have become a constitu-
tive part of this “global householding” phenomenon. “Insecurity” for 
FODWs stemming from legal restrictions is found not only at a national 
level, but also within additional layers of regional and global jurisdiction. 
Scholars in gender and migration studies have examined the legal as well 
as psychological elements of the insecurities of women, especially female 
migrants, who accept live-in domestic jobs and are forced to work long 
hours under tough working conditions.7 IR scholarship can further show 
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that the processes of “global householding” are increasingly occurring 
all over the world, and these women are subject to the multiplicity of the 
constraining national, regional, and global regimes.
Third, this chapter tries to challenge the state-centric academic analysis, 
and concentrates instead on the household as the space where individuals 
of different backgrounds meet and pool diverse resources for the purpose 
of ensuring the continuity of the collective unit. Within the household, 
we communicate and negotiate daily with one another, with efforts to 
establish what this volume calls the interactive “multiculturality,” on 
which the basis of the convivial relationship is formed. By demonstrat-
ing that households are undergoing transformation due to population 
movements (one of the main forms being labor migrations), this chapter 
highlights how our differences are currently confronted and overcome 
through our daily contacts and interactions. Specifically, this analysis 
demonstrates that “global householding” has become a prevalent live-
lihood strategy in both developed and developing countries. Mary 
Poppinses are no longer localized characters in one region, but have 
been globalized and regulated. While such workers might help to secure 
access to the world for those who can afford to hire them, this process 
also makes the workers themselves and their families become even more 
insecure. By underestimating the impact of “global householding,” either 
localized or temporary, we risk missing the “actually existing” struggles 
caused by global population movement and transactions.
The next section explains the causes of the widespread “feminization” 
of migration and introduces the concepts of “global householding” 
and “global de-householding.” The chapter then examines how the 
disciplines of international relations and security studies deal with the 
“security” and “insecurity” of FODWs. To explore the “security” and 
“insecurity” of FODWs, this chapter draws on gender studies by adopt-
ing the analytical framework of the so-called “gendered geographies 
of power” (Pessar & Mahler, 2003, pp. 812–846), a research concept 
focusing on the ability of each female individual to act as an agent in 
today’s world. It questions the extent to which each female individual 
is capable of acting as a potential agent, i.e. what determines their 
agency and what influences their ability to fulfill their power as an 
agent? This leads to the following section, which focuses on the way 
national, regional, and global regimes do indeed constrain such agency 
and thereby threaten the “security” of FODWs.
In conclusion, this chapter argues that whenever mothers or daugh-
ters go abroad as FODWs, their family members back home are exposed 
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to “insecurity,” most likely to a similar degree as the FODWs themselves. 
Possibly some FODWs in host countries become empowered, (re-)gaining 
an agency they never possessed in their home nation. Nonetheless, the 
“insecurity” of the family back home can only be overcome through 
substantial changes in the “geographies of power” in both the host 
and home countries. With both FODWs and their families in sight, 
this chapter suggests in its final analysis that we cannot conclude that 
the emerging activities of FODWs represent a great sign of “insecurity 
reduction” if one thereby ignores the inherently double-sided dimen-
sion of the problem. It also emphasizes that the nexus of global 
householding and global de-householding affects our lives in today’s 
globalized world, and no one, whether in Europe, Africa, or Asia, can be 
free from the changes—and even crises—caused by the reconfiguration 
of the household beyond national borders. Thus, we are hard-pressed 
to find a new framework in which to analyze this global phenomenon.
8.2 The “feminization” of international migration
8.2.1 The “feminization” of international migration explained
For Castles and Miller (2009), “feminization” is one of six key words 
describing the international movement of people since the 1980s.8 
It is true that women have been moving abroad for as long as their male 
counterparts. However, these two scholars emphasize the increasing 
volume of female migration since the 1980s as remarkable. Structural 
changes in the industry sector and more active female participation in 
the labor market, as well as new demands from aging populations in 
developed countries, have made overseas female workers an increas-
ingly indispensable workforce in the care and homemaking fields 
(Pessar & Mahler, 2003). These fields are traditionally defined as “women’s 
work.” They tend to pay very little and involve hiring temporary or 
even irregular workers. A large percentage of overseas female workers are 
employed in live-in situations. Altogether, their unique plights—being 
underpaid, insecure, dependent, and isolated—have received little aca-
demic attention so far.9
Numerous studies have already revealed the reasons for the increasing 
number of female overseas workers (Gregson & Lowe, 1994; Enloe, 2000, 
pp. 177–194). Building on such scholarship, this chapter emphasizes that 
the social and economic conditions of the sending countries contribute 
to the trend as much as those at the receiving end. Two contributing 
factors are the introduction of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) in the 
1990s and the existing “domestic servant culture” among middle-class 
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families in many less developed countries. Generally, welfare spending has 
been reduced to meet the targets set by SAPs. Thus, the poor become poorer 
and their standard of living plummets.10 Foreign companies in export 
promotion zones tend to create high demand for young female workers, 
but lower demand for their male counterparts. Once young women 
then enter the waged labor market, they naturally aim for higher wages, 
whether the jobs they seek are offered domestically or abroad. As long as 
they are well paid, they might not hesitate to venture overseas and send 
more money back home. Without public welfare support, it is they who 
need to fend for their aging parents and young siblings.
In addition, it has long been quite common in the developing world 
to hire home servants. As such, a so-called “domestic servant culture” 
has prevailed for some time. It is often the case that FODWs had already 
worked as domestic servants in their own countries when they took the 
step of going abroad (Connell, 2008). While working as a servant in a 
middle-class family in their home countries, many FODWs at the same 
time allot a portion of their income to employing a servant to look after 
their own family. Hence, an economic “food chain of domestic work” 
emerges. At all levels of the chain, people become accustomed to relying 
on outside helpers in their own houses, whether they actually like it or 
not. With family care in the hands of waged servants, it is the drive for 
the highest wage, be it in the home country or in a foreign land, that 
entices them to work abroad. At the upper end of the chain, wealthy 
families in the developed world successfully obtain low-waged domestic 
workers by extending their hunt globally. In so doing, they may raise 
their standard of living, resulting in more time and money for them-
selves. To support the high standard of those now rich in time and cash, 
the FODWs, in contrast, suffer global separation from their own loved 
and treasured families.
8.2.2 “Global householding” and “Global de-householding”
In this chapter, the key concepts used to analyze female migration 
are “global householding” and “global de-householding.” The con-
cept of “global householding” was developed by Michael Douglass of 
Hawaii University and his present research group (Douglass, 2006). 
With increasing global movements of people, he renews his focus on 
the concept of “household.” The importance of “household” in the 
world-system was emphasized by Immanuel Wallerstein more than two 
decades ago (Smith, Wallerstein, & Evers, 1984). According to Douglass, 
today’s “household” is undergoing enormous changes due to low ferti-
lity rates and the longevity prevalent throughout the developed world. 
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In addition, governments worldwide have increasingly privatized social 
services, and thus providing care for the elderly and infants has become 
too great a burden for each household to bear on its own. With the 
population rapidly aging and shrinking, the households of developed 
countries are seeking help from abroad, mostly from developing coun-
tries. As a result, quite a few “households” in this globalized world are 
supported by financial and physical inputs beyond national borders, 
and are thereby successively transformed into “global households,” or 
rather forms of “global householding” (Douglass, 2006, pp. 421–425). 
Douglass summarizes the major features of “global householding” as 
the increasing attempts to form and sustain households through global 
movements and transactions among household members through 
various means such as marriage, child-bearing and adoption, and hiring 
foreign domestic helpers and caregivers (Douglass, 2006, pp. 424–425).
To supplement this idea, this chapter introduces an additional dimen-
sion to “global householding,” namely “global de-householding.” By 
hiring FODWs, an employer’s family indeed experiences “global house-
holding.” It clearly improves their quality of life by having FODWs do 
the cooking and cleaning, for example. At the same time, however, 
the FODWs’ own families back home face “global de-householding,” 
losing an important family member who could have looked after them 
and improved their quality of life as well. In a sense, one of the most 
important features of today’s “insecurity” of FODWs is that it is by 
nature globalized beyond national jurisdiction. The conditions for both 
concepts, “global householding” and “global de-householding,” occur 
simultaneously and are inseparably interlinked. Furthermore, whether 
it is regarded as “global householding” or “global de-householding” 
depends on whose viewpoint we assume and the extent to which we 
see ourselves as autonomous agents in the process.
“Global householding” and “global de-householding” are relational 
concepts in that they involve the countries and family units at both the 
sending and receiving ends. The extent of their effects depends on the 
relationship between those who move across and those who stay within 
national borders. As pointed out, it has long been common for upper 
class families in developed Western European countries to hire live-in 
maids. The same can be said for the wealthy in developing countries. In 
developing countries, such live-in maids were also often alienated and 
exposed to long working hours under tough conditions. Today’s Mary 
Poppinses, nonetheless, are mainly from developing countries, leaving 
their families behind to work long and hard in the rich world. Thanks 
to FODWs, those who live in developed countries may be freed to 
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concentrate their energies on waged jobs and enjoy more leisure time. 
Thanks to “global householding,” they can choose what to do and what 
not to do. Furthermore, some may actively further advance “global 
householding” by sending their own children to study or work abroad 
in the quest for higher wages. Ultimately, they choose whether or not to 
expose themselves to the “global householding” phenomenon. In con-
trast, most FODWs venture abroad toward something they cannot gain 
in their home countries, such as economic advancement, or social or 
political freedom.
From the viewpoint of FODWs coming from the Philippines, for 
example, the “global householding” of their employer in Britain is 
based on their own “global de-householding.” Under these circum-
stances, such Filipinas are deprived of the choice of caring for their 
aging parents and growing children. Some academics are concerned 
that the children of FODWs may suffer psychological loss, thus falling 
into “insecurity” in return for the economic gains accrued (Parreñas, 
2005). Essentially, the “global householding” of families in developed 
countries always exists against the background and mostly at the 
expense of the “global de-householding” of those in less affluent coun-
tries. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, FODWs are denied the oppor-
tunity to act as independent actors with the ability to claim their own 
rights and their own “security” in host countries. Consequently, the 
actual costs of upholding a high level of “security” for those families 
who opt for “global householding” are simply transferred, in the form 
of “global de-householding,” to the FODWs and the families they leave 
behind. These two concepts should therefore be examined together to 
demonstrate that these developments are two sides of the same coin. 
When viewed as a pair, they present a complete picture of the rewards 
and penalties arising from these global phenomena.
8.3 The “security” and “insecurity” of FODWs
8.3.1 What do we mean by the “security” 
and “insecurity” of FODWs?
Since the UNDP Human Development Report was published in 1994, its 
key concept, “human security,” has inspired a heated debate among 
scholars and practitioners. Numerous studies have attempted to clarify 
the relationship between “human security” and the conventional 
understanding of “national security” in IR. Some scholars argue that 
the newly suggested concept of “human security” could be further dif-
ferentiated to distinguish between “human security,” which is provided 
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by societal institutions and services, and “personal security,” which 
comprises the maintenance of life and existence (Hatsuse, 2003). With 
regard to FODWs, the immigration legislation and policies of the receiv-
ing country often assume their dependency on the male member of the 
family, simply ignoring the fact that the FODWs travel independently 
to work and support themselves. This often results in the denial of their 
capacity and their legal right, as individuals, to claim “human security.” 
Such deprivation of institutional protection and societal services con-
sequentially leads to the erosion of their “personal security,” ultimately 
their very life and existence. In this chapter, “security,” unless specified, 
refers to “human security,” deprivation of which ultimately threatens 
the “personal security” of FODWs and their families.
It is important to note that immigration, nationality, and labor-related 
legislation and policies in most countries today are unlikely to be explic-
itly discriminatory against women. In their written form, they appear to be 
value-neutral. However, as mentioned, when actually implemented they 
became gendered in the sense that women are regarded as individuals who 
do not work or reside on their own account. Their entry statuses are often 
based on that of male members of the family, preventing women from 
accepting a waged job or remaining in the country if they get divorced or 
lose their male partner. In reality, as previous research has demonstrated, 
FODWs are placed under the triple burdens of gender, ethnicity/race, and 
occupation (Anderson, 2000, pp. 1–8). Thus, neutral-sounding legislation 
and policies play a key role in rendering FODWs’ “insecurity” invisible, 
leaving the triple burdens of FODWs intact.
Worse, as the following section demonstrates, FODWs today face 
not only national legislation and policies that implicitly exploit and 
discriminate against them in comparison to male migrants, but also 
regional and global regimes. In combination, they remove the plights 
and exploitation of FODWs from public view. This triple layer of 
national, regional, and global regimes, which enhances the “insecurity” 
of FODWs, is the main characteristic of today’s migration control mech-
anism. It is therefore vital to shed light on this complex multi-layered 
mechanism by unwrapping it, layer by layer, and examining how each 
layer works in combination with the others to prevent FODWs from 
pursuing their “security.”
8.3.2 What does security studies learn about the “insecurity” 
of FODWs from migration and gender studies?
Towards and since the end of the Cold War, according to Krause and 
Williams (1996, p. 229), three main factors have determined the course 
Female Domestic Workers on the Move 145
of development in the field of security studies: first, dissatisfaction 
among some scholars of security studies regarding the emphasis on 
states and the traditional military-centric approach of neo-realists; 
second, an urgent need to respond to the challenges arising from a 
post-Cold War security order; and third, a strong desire for the security 
studies discipline to become more relevant to contemporary concerns. 
Broadly, Krause and Williams point out three directions in which the 
so-called “new thinking on security” debate is heading (Krause & Williams, 
1996, pp. 229–230). The first approach aims to broaden the scope of 
security studies with the purpose of including non-military issues under 
the concept of “security.” The second trend is to deepen the agenda of 
security studies by flexibly adjusting the level of analysis from that of 
individual or human security to that of international or global security. 
The third group maintains the state-centric approach, but focuses its 
analysis on diversified forms of inter-state security cooperation, such 
as common, cooperative, collective, and comprehensive cooperation 
(Krause & Williams, 1996, p. 230). The traditional approach in the field 
sees states, groups, or individuals as givens, and treats threats external 
to these givens in the search for solutions to remove such threats. 
In contrast, the first and second approaches mentioned above focus on 
the process through which threats against an individual or group are 
constituted as “social facts” (Krause & Williams, 1996, pp. 242–243). Their 
interest therefore lies in who—a government, business enterprise, or 
charismatic person—defines “security” for particular issues—economic 
well-being, military build-up, or environmental degradation—and 
in the process, under what conditions do they effectively provide it 
(Krause & Williams, 1996, pp. 242–243).
Among the scholars within this “new thinking on security,” Buzan and 
those who contributed to his work (1998) engage in “the most thorough 
and continuous exploration of the significance and implications of a 
widening security agenda for security studies” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 480). 
Nonetheless, even their efforts are criticized for failing to pay attention 
to the concept of “security” on the basis of gender.11 This lack of atten-
tion, Hansen (2000) insists, results from one of the two main shortcom-
ings of security studies, namely “security as silence.”12 According to 
Hansen, “security as silence” occurs in situations where the potential 
subject of security is forced to either remain silent or likely face even 
greater “insecurity” if the particular situation should receive attention. 
FODWs fit well into this category. As “women,” they face enormous 
pressures to tolerate lesser “security,” whether in their home country 
or receiving countries. In addition, as “overseas workers,” their entry 
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status often depends entirely on their employers, thus depriving them 
of any chance of challenging their bosses. In particular, for “irregular” or 
“illegal” female workers, the only remaining option is to remain silent 
in spite of their constant “insecurity.” Regardless of whether remaining 
silent is instigated by force or by one’s own will, unless the resulting 
“insecurity” surfaces, the phenomenon will never become a subject of 
security studies. Consequently, the “insecurity” of FODWs has remained 
under-studied until very recently. Those researchers who try to intro-
duce gender perspectives into security studies argue that the concept of 
“security” needs to be redefined in a way that reflects the economic, politi-
cal, or social conditions surrounding a particular individual or group.13 
Whether one feels “secure” or “insecure” depends on one’s position. 
Thus, what should really be examined are the economic, political, and 
social structures within which “security” and “insecurity” are constructed 
(Tickner, 1997, p. 624).
In the 1990s, migration studies researchers began to learn from gender 
studies, thus becoming exposed to a new understanding of “security.” 
Since the late 1980s, they had already begun rectifying the stereotype 
of a migrant being male and single. Yet, their efforts fall short of trans-
forming their analytical approach wholeheartedly; female migrants are 
still often simply added alongside their male counterparts as further 
issues of concern. Some critics thus described this new approach in 
migration studies as “adding women and stirring” (Curran et al., 2006, 
p. 209). In the early 1990s, academic interest within the field further 
shifted to network formation in a transnational setting, especially on 
the basis of, and with an emphasis on, race, ethnicity, and nationality. 
Meanwhile, those academics sympathetic and devoted to gender per-
spectives became concerned that what they had learned in the late 
1980s might once again be forgotten in the new agenda. This time, in 
paying attention to gender issues in the context of transnational set-
tings, they attempt to present analytical frameworks under which one 
does not merely “add women and stir,” but that rather bring “gender” 
as a relational concept into a holistic perspective. This new analytical 
framework focuses on the way in which gender relationships are con-
structed beyond national borders. Henceforth, the treatment and 
identity of FODWs also becomes subject to transnationally constructed 
gender relationships (Donato et al., 2006, pp. 3–26).
Among various scholarly works that aim to bring gender into migra-
tion studies, that of Pessar and Mahler presents an analytical framework 
based on “gender geographies of power (GGP)” (Pessar & Mahler, 2003, 
pp. 812–846). This deserves special attention. The GGP framework has 
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four key concepts as its main constitutive pillars. These are “geographical 
scales,” “social location,” “power geometry,” and “imagination.” First, 
according to Pessar and Mahler, gender—a relational concept—operates 
within “geographical scales” that comprise multiple spatial and social 
scales across transnational spaces. At the same time, gender ideologies 
and relations are continuously reaffirmed and reconfigured within 
each constituent “geographical scale.” “Social location,” as the second 
component of this analytical framework, refers to people’s positions 
within interconnected power hierarchies, which are created through 
various socially stratifying factors such as history, politics, economics, 
geography, and kinship. Since the hierarchies of each factor operate at 
various levels and affect the “social location” of individuals or groups, 
Pessar and Mahler emphasize that social location is always fluid and not 
fixed. Certain advantages and disadvantages are conferred according to 
one’s “social location.” Furthermore, “social location” determines the 
types and degrees of agency one can exercise. Pessar and Mahler call 
this “power geometry,” which is the third component of their frame-
work. The fourth component is “imagination.” In examining agency, 
they emphasize that it not only implies people’s ability to influence 
others and their surroundings, but also their cognitive power to initi-
ate change. Suppose that two people are in the same “social location.” 
One might simply be buried, whereas the other might intend to fight 
back thanks to “imagination.”
Focusing on “power geometry” makes us aware that it is not only 
crucial how transnational “geographical scales” are formed; it is also 
who and what controls their formation that plays the key role in 
understanding the “security” and “insecurity” of today’s FODWs. This 
general understanding draws our attention to multiple-layered migra-
tion regimes, which are touched on in the next section. Such layers of 
legality reflect the intentions of the powerful within today’s “geographi-
cal scales.” Given that various regimes intend to keep FODWs in their 
current “social position”—invisible—it may still be possible for FODWs 
themselves to transform their “power geometry” through “imagination.” 
Taking “imagination” into consideration, the GGP framework suggests 
that not all FODWs should remain powerless, exploited, and controlled 
by employers and governments in their host and home countries. It 
recognizes that their “social location” can shift. “Power geometry” is 
malleable, and some FODWs could someday fulfill the roles of initiators, 
refiners, and transformers. To frustrate such challenges from FODWs, 
however, powerful players—national governments being the main players 
in this case—continue to strengthen confining mechanisms, among 
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which migration regimes comprise the most explicit and concrete form. 
They play an important role in depriving FODWs of “imagination” and 
maintaining the current “power geometry.” In building multiple-layered 
migration regimes at the global, regional, and local levels, national 
governments of both developed and developing countries aim to control 
the transnational “geographical scales” in which they are predominant.
8.4 National, regional, and global regimes 
surrounding FODWs
8.4.1 National regimes
Currently, governments in Western developed countries adopt citizen-
ship- and immigration-related legislation and policies that reflect an 
“anti-immigrant, pro-immigration” nature.14 The purposes of these types 
of policies in relation to FODWs are two-fold. First, to keep them mar-
ginalized in the society, they force FODWs to accept only certain types 
of occupation and working conditions. Second, they enable the host 
government to increase the volume of incoming FODWs for the purpose 
of upholding the “security” of its nationals in exchange for the FODWs’ 
“insecurity.” For example, the work permit system not only distinguishes 
between immigrants with legal or illegal entry status, but also ties the 
former to certain jobs and certain working conditions. In the view of 
governments in developed countries, what they need is not “immigrants 
in general” but “those who fulfill a certain job.” Thus the main aim of 
currently implemented immigration regimes is to link immigrants to 
precisely those jobs that nationals neither wish to have nor dare to fill. 
In this way, host governments can enjoy the benefits of introducing 
foreign workers who will work for the nation’s citizens and raise their 
level of “security” at very little cost.
Taking the British case as an example, British legislation and policies 
in the migration-related field no longer include explicitly discrimina-
tory terms and provisions against female migrants. On further scrutiny, 
however, some legislation and policies are applied in a way that might 
be disadvantageous to women. Three areas where discriminatory prac-
tices against immigrant women may abound are the right of entry, 
residence, and employment; of family reunion; and of family formation 
in the form of marriage. First, given that a woman enters the country 
as the “spouse” or “child” of a legal male entrant, her right to enter 
and reside subsequently depends on the right of her husband or father. 
Under the status of “spouse” or “child,” such women are consequently 
prevented from accepting paid work. Suppose a woman enters a country 
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as a legally independent immigrant. In this case, a typical job for her, 
such as domestic worker or carer, tends to be less likely than other jobs 
to confer her with permanent residency. As a result, migrant women are 
subject to a higher risk than their male counterparts with regard to los-
ing their legal entry status and being deported, for example in the case of 
divorce for married women or unemployment for independent migrant 
women. In 1979, the British government abolished the visa category 
for overseas domestic workers (ODWs). Instead, they created a special 
category to allow the wealthy to bring their domestic workers with 
them (Bhabha, 1994, pp. 173–184; Anderson, 2000, pp. 86–107). This 
category, however, was specifically linked to wealthy entrants, and their 
accompanying domestic workers were not allowed to change employer 
lest their entry status be stripped. Until 1998, when immigration regu-
lations regarding ODWs were amended, such workers had to endure 
severe working conditions and even violence from their employer for 
fear of being deprived of their legal status and thus being deported.
The second set of barriers experienced by immigrant women arises 
in connection to family reunion. The fundamental right to family 
reunion is enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights, 
for example. However, it is usually provisional and governed by a 
set of regulations. The required access to adequate accommodation 
and the necessary proof of sole responsibility for childrearing are two 
examples that often work against women in Britain. With their low 
wages, FODWs find it difficult to secure their own accommodation 
to fulfill the requirements of immigration rules. Worse, most FODWs 
often live with their employers; thus, they have no option of bringing 
their children even if they wished to. A thornier regulation that impli-
citly discriminates more against women than the housing one does is 
that of “sole responsibility,” a regulation introduced in 1968. Under 
the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, immigration rules allowed 
immigrants to bring their children only if they as parents residing 
in Britain had “sole responsibility” for the child’s upbringing (Home 
Office, 2005, Chapter 14.5). These provisions, although unintended by 
the then government, worked against many immigrant women from 
Caribbean countries. Some researchers suggest that immigration officers 
either consciously or subconsciously believe in the male breadwinning 
model, and thus think that the male member of the family (father or 
grandfather in this case) determines where the family should be located 
(Bhabha, 1994, pp. 31–39). It is therefore difficult for mothers to bring 
their children to Britain if their fathers or grandfathers, unemployed as 
they may be, reside in their home countries.
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The last case of implicit disadvantage for migrant women relates to 
international marriage. The British government introduced the “primary 
purpose rule” in the 1980s. Until this rule was abolished in 1997, those 
who wished to bring spouses or fiancé(e)s had to prove the genuineness 
of the marriage and that it was the primary reason for coming to Britain. 
Although this rule itself did not include sexually discriminatory phrases 
or conditions, its application tended to be harsher towards women. 
A general stereotype was that male immigrants were more of a threat to 
the labor market than their female counterparts. In consequence, when 
immigrant women applied to the Home Office to invite their husbands 
or fiancés, they were investigated more thoroughly than immigrant 
men were. It was also the case that British immigration rules in relation 
to marriage were based on the prevalent understanding of marriage 
under British law. Consequently, women in polygamous marriages were 
not considered as wives, and second wives were prevented from enter-
ing Britain as spouses. Also, so-called child wives under 16 years of age 
were not admitted as either a spouse or fiancée.
Regardless of the long history of female migration, female migrants 
even today remain invisible with regard to policy making and research. 
As pointed out in the previous section, governments select certain types 
of migrants, and in receiving them, they attempt to maintain the cur-
rent “power geometry.” Inflows of live-in overseas domestic workers 
may reduce the burdens of domestic chores and appear beneficial to 
female nationals with waged jobs. In reality, reliance on FODWs keeps 
intact and reinforces traditional stereotypes of “women at home doing 
housework” and “women taking care of the elderly and childrearing 
at home.” All in all, this may actually prolong the unfair treatment 
of women. In sum, “anti-immigrant, pro-immigration policies” not 
only determine the “social location” of female migrants but also that 
of female nationals at the same time. Women, whether nationals or 
immigrants, are kept in a weaker “social location” and their agency still 
depends on male members of the family. In general, only a few lucky 
women take up paying jobs, forcing other unlucky women to take 
over domestic chores, doing so under the conditions set by the current 
“power geometry” of male dominance and female subjugation.
8.4.2 Regional and global regimes
Traditionally, national governments have claimed the exclusive autho rity 
to control who enters, stays in, and leaves their territory. Yet, national 
governments are now aware that they need to act together to tighten 
control over the international movement of people. Thus, they have 
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established a form of inter-state cooperation to deal with the growing 
volume. In the field of migration control, therefore, both regional and 
global levels of control mechanisms are added, complementing national 
policy instruments designed to uncover undocumented or overstayed 
foreign migrants and deter asylum-seekers. It is true that national govern-
ments are also delegating policy implementation to municipal and 
local sectors, conferring upon them, for example, the competence and 
authority to check suspicious cases.15 Nevertheless, such sectors are subject 
to their national governments and do not generally take their own 
policy initiatives. This chapter thus concentrates on the development 
of regional and global migration control policies, focusing on those of 
the European Union (EU), and on global cooperation in the form of 
international conventions.
It may be true that regional and global institutions such as the EU and 
the United Nations (UN) exert only an indirect and non-compulsory 
influence on national policies. Nevertheless, they may play an impor-
tant role in advancing some kind of agenda and changing our mental 
frame of perception. The idea of universal human rights is the prime 
example, and has been greatly promoted since the end of the Second 
World War by international and regional organizations and through 
various international conventions (Donnelly, 1986, pp. 599–642). 
Human rights activists and groups, in the face of domestic deadlocks, 
bypass national governments. They seek support from international 
organizations to have them exert pressure from abroad to change 
national policies. Through the “boomerang effect” (Keck & Sikkink, 
1998), they wish to ensure that national governments admit cases of 
human rights violation and rectify them. This certainly also applies to 
the subject of this chapter. When the maltreatment and invisibility of 
FODWs come to light, regional and global institutions may be able to 
affect national policies. Possibly, the current “power geometry” may 
shift through these regional and global regimes, and FODWs might 
finally be able to speak up and improve their “security.”
Recently, the UN and regional organizations such as the EU have 
become extremely active in promoting multinational cooperation to 
combat the trafficking of migrants (United Nations General Assembly 
[UNGA], 2000a, b). Although promoters of multinational cooperation 
claim that remedies for victims of trafficking are the prime purpose, the 
actual practice of existing cooperation appears to concentrate on con-
trolling and regulating the international movement of people. Actual 
help for the victims is supposed to be left to national governments, but 
concrete actions seem to be slow to evolve. Contrary to the high hopes 
152 Rieko Karatani
of human rights academics and activists, neither regional nor global 
regimes in the field of migration are aiming to shift the “power geo-
metry” in favor of migrants. They are more likely to deny the potential 
agency of migrants who have already been rendered powerless, and 
to uphold the very “power geometry” that works against them. Some 
academics even suggest that national governments deliberately advance 
regional and global regimes with the intention of avoiding the national 
judiciary and furthering control over migrants (Guiraudon & Lahav, 
2000, pp. 163–195). In a sense, the establishment of regional and global 
regimes diversifies the means of national government, and expands 
the merits of the existing “power geometry.” Furthermore, the levels of 
control mechanisms interactively strengthen each other.
If we look at the actual provisions of international conventions, we 
find that the term “gender” appears frequently within them. Relevant 
international organizations, such as the UN, have for some time actively 
promoted awareness of “gender-related” issues. After nearly 20 years’ 
preparation, the UN finally adopted the International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families (ICMW) in 1990. As the “first comprehensive universal 
codification of migrants’ rights” (Cholewinski, 1997, p. 199), a migrant 
worker is defined in Article 2(1) as “a person who is to be engaged, is 
engaged, or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of 
which he or she is not a national.” This definition of migrant workers 
is considered the most comprehensive in any international instrument 
concerning migrants, and is thus praised in itself as a “major accom-
plishment” (Hune, 1987, pp. 123–124). Obviously, migrant women 
form part of the category of “migrant workers” and should be protected 
as such. They are also supposed to receive protection as members of 
migrants’ families (Article 1). Specifically, Article 1 declares that the 
ICMW applies to all migrant workers and their families “without dis-
tinction of any kind,” such as on the basis of sex. Article 7 also prohibits 
discrimination on the grounds of sex with respect to the rights provided 
for in the ICMW. To clarify the intent of sexual equality, the drafters of 
the convention decided to use the terms “he or she” and “his or her” 
instead of “he” and “his” towards the end of the preparatory process 
(Hune, 1991). They could not have made it clearer that all the conven-
tion’s provisions are applicable to both migrant men and women.
Migrant workers are, according to the convention, to be treated 
equally to nationals with regard to economic, social, and cultural 
rights. For example, employment conditions (Article 25), social security 
(Article 27), emergency medical care (Article 28), and access to education 
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(Article 30) are specifically mentioned as areas where equality should be 
guaranteed. Furthermore, Articles 26 and 40 provide migrant workers 
with the right not only to partake in trade union activities, but also to 
“form associations and trade unions in the State of employment.” The 
right to education is also widely conferred upon migrant workers, as 
seen in Article 43, for example. It grants migrant workers and nationals 
equal access to vocational guidance, training, and retraining facilities. 
Migrant women who had been treated as invisible even in their home 
countries might be able to make use of the opportunities provided by 
the convention to improve their “social location.”
Even as a member of a migrant’s family, female migrants can receive 
access to vocational guidance and training under Article 45, although 
the extent of access is limited in comparison to that stipulated in Article 
43. In addition, the convention provides the possibility for migrant 
women who have entered a country as a dependent or spouse to remain 
and reside there even after the death of a migrant worker or the dissolu-
tion of their marriage (Article 50). To save family members in the case 
of a migrant’s death or divorce, the provision imposed the obligation 
on states to take into account the length of their stay and authorize 
them to remain and even work. Even though it does not grant them 
an absolute right to remain in the country of employment, this special 
consideration to family members was a welcome addition for migrant 
women whose residential status was conditionally based on the status 
of their husbands or fathers.
Despite these provisions, the ICMW has received considerable criti-
cism for not paying sufficient attention to migrant women since its 
enactment (Hune, 1991, pp. 800–815). The biggest criticism arises from 
the fact that the convention fails to go beyond the “add women and 
stir” approach. As Hune (1991, pp. 812–813) suggests, the ICMW draft-
ers did not consider that the concept of “labor” may not mean the same 
to women as to men. As mentioned earlier, a number of migrant women 
are employed in the care and housekeeping fields. These fields have 
for a long time been considered as “women’s fields,” in which they are 
supposed to excel by nature. As a result, jobs related to domestic chores, 
childrearing, and elderly care, for example, are often paid very little or 
next to nothing. To some people, these jobs do not qualify as “waged 
labor,” as they do not require any special skills or talent, since women 
are supposed to be born with such skills. The ICMW simply aims for 
sexual equality, but does not intend to tackle these implicit assumptions 
or the notion that “female-type work” is inferior to “male-type work.” In 
addition, the convention does not consider that female migrants have 
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to play the role of primary caregiver for children and family members, 
spending more time than their male partners at home to perform 
household chores. Given that equal access to “labor” between nationals 
and migrants is guaranteed, female migrants, in contrast to males, need 
further public support from their host countries before they can accept 
employment. Without waged employment, migrant women may con-
tinue to rely on their spouses and remain invisible in the host society. 
As previously pointed out, seemingly neutral terms such as “labor” and 
“laborer” are often defined in a way that might disadvantage women, 
and thus require redefinition to change the existing “power geometry.” 
Ultimately, the ICMW does not aim for the fundamental transforma-
tion of the “power geometry,” but rather for the alleviation of the 
plights of migrants within given circumstances.
At the level of regional regimes such as the EU, issues relating to 
migrant women are also handled with the “add women and stir” 
approach. The frequent appearance of the term “gender” in EU publi-
cations might not yet have resulted in the improvement of the “social 
location” of women in general. EU social policies have gone to great 
lengths to establish equality between women and men, especially in 
terms of access to labor markets (Ackers, 1998, p. 2). Not only policy 
makers but also academics are seeking the best way to achieve equal 
treatment between the sexes at the EU level. A voluminous amount 
of research has been conducted on gender equality in labor markets 
for quite some time.16 As mentioned with regard to the global regime, 
while current EU policies may improve the “social location” of EU 
working women in employment, they are not intended to challenge 
the current “power geometry” of FODWs. They simply allow EU 
women with a job to be treated in the same way as EU men, as long as 
the traditional “white male breadwinning model of family relations” 
remains intact. In other words, according to Ackers, all residents of 
the EU are classified into several categories on the basis of citizenship, 
gender, and access to employment, and are prioritized according to a 
combination of these three factors (Ackers, 1998, p. 40). Within the 
hierarchy of people legally resident in the national territory, those 
males who contribute to the labor market and hold citizenship are 
ranked first. Next are female spouses with citizenship, as they are act-
ing as women are “supposed to”—that is, being supportive of male 
citizens. Illegal migrants aside, the remainder of the pecking order 
is as follows: working female citizenship holders, citizenship hold-
ers not active in the labor market—single mothers and the elderly, 
for example—employed legal male migrants, and a small number of 
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female migrants holding skilled jobs. Unfortunately, FODWs are still 
at the very bottom (Ackers, 1998, p. 40).
Finally, seemingly neutral concepts and categories such as “labor,” 
“laborers,” and “waged labor” have all been defined in a male-dominant 
world. Thus, they intentionally or unintentionally tend to lower women’s 
“social location.” Peterson declares that regimes based on male experi-
ence and male understanding cannot really account for women (1996, 
pp. 11–28). Accordingly, three options are suggested: “either females 
cannot be added (they are marginalized), or they must become ‘like 
men’ (they are masculinized), or they are included, and the meaning of 
the category is transformed to include femaleness.” (Peterson, 1996, p. 17, 
emphasis in original). So far, the current regional and global regimes 
include women by forcing them to “masculinize” themselves for fear of 
being “marginalized.” It is obvious that traditional concepts, categories, 
and stereotypes need to be transformed to include femaleness if we are 
to aim to fundamentally challenge the “power geometry” on women’s 
behalf and to improve their “social location.” Currently, regional and 
global regimes might work favorably for some women who become 
“masculinized.” To other women, the vast majority perhaps, they 
merely complement national regimes that make women accept more 
“insecurity” than men. For FODWs, today’s multiple-layered regimes—
national, regional, and global—form an even more starkly oppressive 
environment than before.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to make three points. First, today’s FODWs 
are not singularly glued to a certain “social location” by national 
regimes. Rather, they are triply fixed in their social and legal cage by 
the two additional layers of regional and global regimes. At a super-
ficial glance, the emergent regional and global regimes in the field of 
migration offer a glimmer of hope in that they seem concerned with 
the plights of FODWs and appear to offer a remedy for them. In reality, 
they are favorable only to a small group of women who are willing to 
accept the current “power geometry.” FODWs remain, as always, pow-
erless and invisible. Worse, their “insecurity” is triply fixed. Second, 
emergent regional and global regimes do not aim to challenge the 
current “power geometry” and FODWs’ resulting “social location” at 
the very bottom in any host country. Regional and global regimes may 
only indirectly influence national governments and policy makers, pro-
vided their “boomerang effect” is felt. Yet, today’s regional and global 
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regimes relevant to migration are established to protect “laborers” and 
“migrants” as they are currently understood. By accepting these concepts, 
these regimes, albeit inadvertently, may be supporting, reinforcing, and 
cementing the current “power geometry.”
Third, as migrant women move across national borders, so too does 
their “insecurity.” Unfortunately, space limitations restrict this chapter 
from providing further examination of the above cases in Britain or 
additional examples outside of Europe. We nonetheless find in today’s 
world the prevalence of “insecurity” that crosses borders to the families 
of FODWs back home in return for the “security” of nationals in their 
country of employment. As mentioned earlier, the benefits of “global 
householding” are reaped by people in developed countries at the 
expense of the damage of “global de-householding,” which is shouldered 
by those in developing countries. Of course, the perception of the phe-
nomenon as “global householding” or “global de-householding” differs 
depending on timing and the focus of analysis. Yet, by presenting the 
two concepts together, we can highlight a lopsided relationship between 
FODWs and their families back home vis-à-vis their employers in the host 
countries. Once aware of the zero-sum elements of “global household-
ing” and “global de-householding,” we can take a further step to reveal 
how these are currently consolidated and even strengthened. Emerging 
regional and global regimes neither guarantee “security” for FODWs nor 
prevent “insecurity” from being transferred to their own families, let 
alone saving them. Worse, most FODWs are from developing countries 
where social welfare systems are barely existent. While the family members 
left behind—especially the elderly and infants—may benefit economi-
cally by receiving money, they certainly lose out psychologically.
The previous section cited Peterson, who stressed the need to trans-
form traditional concepts and categories, as they were formed through 
male experience and thus oblivious to the experience of women. 
Otherwise, the current “power geometry” surrounding FODWs will 
remain unchanged. Recently, some academics have paid attention to 
networking and the mutual assistance in which FODWs are actively 
engaged, claiming that they constitute burgeoning “political activi-
ties” and portraying them as signs of change (Kofman et al., 2000, 
pp. 163–191). In line with this argument, Kofman and others, for exam-
ple, dispute conventional understanding with regard to the political 
rights of migrants. They insist that while FODWs might be devoid of 
voting rights, they are devoid of other types of political activities within 
the host society as well. Through community groups and networks, 
FODWs are in constant contact with each other and even with the 
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host population. Taking a wider definition of “politics,” Kofman and 
others try to perceive FODWs not as “objects of political discourse,” 
but as “participating subjects” (p. 163). Since most FODWs in their 
home countries were afforded limited access to any kind of political 
activity, they may be more liberated in their countries of employment, 
thus finding themselves in a much stronger “social location.” To some 
academics, therefore, FODWs might be accredited with the “power to 
effect change” (Hardy-Fanta, 1993, p. 30). Undoubtedly, FODWs are 
not always submissive, invisible, and passive objects of exploitation and 
oppression. Legal exclusion from the formal political process without 
the right to vote in a way encourages FODWs to become more active in 
forming associations and networks in their daily lives.
Pessar and Mahler’s analytical framework—“gender geographies of 
power”—introduced and applied in this chapter, presents “imagina-
tion” as one of the four main components. Considering people in 
similar “social positions,” some remain subdued while others take the 
initiative to challenge the system. The root of these different reactions 
lies in “imagination.” Therefore, FODWs’ networks and community 
campaigns might some day provide a strong initiator for change and 
result in a more tangible challenge to the current “power geometry.” 
Even so, one of the three main arguments of this chapter was the 
emergence of multiple-layered regimes that threaten the “security” 
of FODWs. Whatever activities FODWs may be involved in within 
their country of employment and residence, such activities need to go 
beyond national borders before they can ever lead to a shift in “power 
geometry” in a transnational arena. There is no doubt that we should 
encourage the burgeoning political activities of FODWs, but at the same 
time, we should not expect too much from them. Ultimately, chal-
lenges to and alteration of the “power geometry” should come from 
those with power. Only they can build counter-regimes of transnational 
“geographical scales” and transform the “power geometry” in favor of 
the powerless. Only with their concession and willingness can we estab-
lish a truly multicultural space in which differences in power, gender, 
wealth, and so on are intensively negotiated, and even reconciled.
Notes
Professor, Faculty of Policy Studies, Kansai University. This chapter is based on 
a presentation given at an international conference—“Global Migration and the 
Household in East Asia”—in Seoul, on 2–3 February, 2007. The author is grateful 
for all the comments from the floor.
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1. Persons who look after children on a contract basis are referred to in various 
ways, for example as a “nanny,” “au pair,” “maid,” and “child-minder.” The 
definitions of these terms may differ according to the country and era. In 
Britain, for example, “au pair” is a legal immigration status, denoting a person 
who matches the required conditions of age, country of origin, and employ-
ment details. “Child-minders” are required to register themselves in Britain, 
while “nannies” and “maids” lack any form of legal definition. “Nannies” 
usually concentrate on childrearing at the employer’s house, whereas “maids” 
are responsible for all kinds of housework chores as well.
2. Anderson (2000, p. 7) emphasizes the role of a “female” employer who often 
hires female overseas domestic workers (FODWs) under oppressive working 
conditions.
3. The ILO convention concerning decent work for domestic workers (no. 189) 
came into entry in 2013 in order to combat deplorable working conditions, 
labor exploitation, and abuses of human rights. Although the number of 
domestic workers is steadily increasing all over the world, only 12 countries 
so far have ratified this convention.
4. Douglass (2006). Professor Michael Douglass’ research program at Hawaii 
University introduces the term “global householding.” The term “house-
hold” includes members based on fictive family relationships, such as nan-
nies, who take the childrearing role over from birth parents, and live-in 
overseas carers, who look after elderly members of a family. In contrast, the 
term “family” is usually restricted to biological members. Nowadays, many 
“families” in both developed and developing countries may have members 
working or residing abroad. As the volume of movement of people beyond 
borders increases, so does the number of families who, for their liveli-
hoods, depend on money sent from abroad by family members or who hire 
workers from abroad to perform their household chores. In sum, it is more 
appropriate to use the term “household” or even “householding” than 
“family” to describe how people in the globalized world live and conduct 
their daily lives.
5. “Security” can mean both “human security,” which is protected by social 
institutions, and “personal security,” which implies the maintenance of one’s 
life. In the case of FODWs, the threat to their “human security” by global, 
regional, and national regimes tends also to threaten their “personal secu-
rity,” leading them into conditions of “insecurity.”
6. There does not yet exist an authoritative definition for “gender.” The author 
follows Pessar and Mahler and defines “gender” as a “process, as one of 
several ways humans create and perpetuate social differences.” Pessar and 
Mahler (2003, p. 813) also consider “gender” as a structure “embedded in 
institutions.” The author agrees with this view, seeing “gender” as part of a 
complex web of institutionalized social relationships that determines one’s 
power within a society.
7. For the case of Britain, see Bhabha and Shutter (1994) for example.
8. Castles and Miller (2009, pp. 8–9). Five other characteristics are “globaliza-
tion,” “differentiation,” “acceleration,” “politicization,” and “proliferation of 
migration transition.”
9. Kofman et al. (2000). Their work is one of the recent pieces of academic 
research to have systematically surveyed the plights and treatment of FODWs.
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10. Chang (2000) emphasizes the impact of SAPs on pushing female laborers in 
developing countries to developed countries to seek higher paid jobs.
11. Hansen (2000), Steans (2006, pp. 63–77), Tickner (1997, pp. 611–32, 2001, 
pp. 36–64). These scholars emphasize the importance of combining gender 
and security studies in general.
12. Hansen (2000, pp. 287, 294–9). The other shortcoming, according to Hansen, 
is what she terms “subsuming security.” She argues that gender-based insecu-
rity tends to be treated as an aspect of national or religious security, and that 
female victims are not regarded as a “referent object.” Unless recognized as a 
“referent object,” they cannot become the subject of security studies.
13. Tickner (2001, pp. 36–64) provides a thorough survey on the way security 
studies is developing by learning from feminist perspectives.
14. Chang (2000, pp. 30–31) points out the differences between pro-immigration 
policies and pro-immigrant policies. According to Chang, the former simply 
encourages the inflow of immigration, which does not necessarily mean 
that it is friendly toward immigrants. It is therefore possible to have a pro-
immigration and anti-immigrant policy at the same time.
15. Guiraudon (2000, pp. 249–69). Since the 1980s, quite a few developed coun-
tries in Western Europe have begun to involve local and municipal govern-
ments in migration control mechanisms. Concentrating on the case of the 
EU, Guiraudon, for example, has worked on the vertical diversification of 
migration control mechanisms, both upward to an international level and 
downward to a local level.
16. See, for example, Gregory, Sales, and Hegewisch (1999) and Council of 
Europe (1996). These works are typical examples of research conducted in 
the 1990s.
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